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Case Comment
FERGUSON v. CITY OF CHARLESTON:
SLOWLY RETURNING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS"
DOCTRINE TO ITS ROOTS
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases
are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident
of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate
interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which
even well settled principles of law will bend.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The central tenet of the Fourth Amendment is that searches
undertaken by government officials must be reasonable. 2 For the
majority of the Nation's history, the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this command of reasonableness to require the presence of a
warrant in governmental searches.3 However, in recent years, the Court
has created a growing number of exceptions to the general rule requiring
the presence of a warrant and probable cause in nonconsensual
searches.4 The most recent, and perhaps most criticized, of these
exceptions is the special needs doctrine. 5 This doctrine provides that in
I N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Ainendment: An Exception Poised
to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 530 (1997).
4 Id.; see also infra note 52 (listing several of the Court's recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement).
5 See generally Jennifer E. Smiley, Comment, Rethifking the "Special Needs" Doctrine:
Suspicionless Dng Testing of High School Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment
Protections, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 811 (2001) (asserting that the Court's special needs cases have
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"exceptional circumstances" where "special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirements impracticable" a court may, rather than require a warrant,
engage in a balancing of governmental and private interests to determine
the reasonableness of a search.6
Since the Pandora's box of special needs was first opened in 1985,
the Court's jurisprudence in this area has struggled to find equilibrium.7
In an initial series of cases, the Court applied the exception by invariably
finding governmental interests to outweigh privacy concerns.8 For
several years, the exception appeared certain to replace the general
preference of a warrant for searches other than those initiated and
conducted by the police. 9 Then, in 1997, the Court decided Chandler v.
Miller,10 a case that seemed to signal a desire by the Court to limit the
special needs doctrine by making its balancing test more difficult to
invoke." However, as the Court failed to modify or adequately
distinguish its earlier opinions, Chandler's ultimate effect was to create
confusion as to whether the Court's previously established framework
remained.12
With Ferguson v. City of Charleston,13 the Court revisited the special
needs doctrine in determining whether unauthorized drug testing of
obstetrics patients in a state hospital fell within the special needs
exception. While the Court held that the drug testing program was not
protected by the special needs exception and, therefore, was
failed to develop a coherent body of case law and calling on the Court to abandon the
doctrine as a failed experiment).
6New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7 See generally Buffaloe, supra note 3.
9 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,664-65 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 624 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,873 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 722 (1987).
9 Buffaloe, supra note 3, at 530-31.
10 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
1n See generally Joy L. Ames, Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special Needs" for
Suspicionless Dng Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REv. 273 (1997).
12 Id.
13 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" DOCTRINE
unconstitutional, it remains to be determined what effect the decision
will have on the special needs doctrine.' 4
This Comment considers the impact of Ferguson as it relates to the
Court's existing special needs framework and attempts to divine its
significance for future cases in this area. To this end, this Comment first
examines the facts relevant to the Court's decision in Ferguson.Is Second,
this Comment discusses the legal background of the special needs
exception, paying close attention to the Court's previous special needs
cases involving suspicionless drug testing.'6 Third, this Comment
analyzes the Court's holding in Ferguson, explaining its significance in
light of previous special needs decisions.17 Finally, this Comment briefly
discusses the implicationi of Ferguson for future special needs cases.'8
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ferguson has as its backdrop the rise of "crack" cocaine use during
the late 1980s and the widely perceived problem of "crack babies" born
to mothers addicted to the drug.' 9 During the fall of 1988, staff members
of a Charleston public hospital operated by the Medical University of
South Carolina ("MUSC") became concerned about an apparent increase
in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care.20 In response to
the perceived problem, MUSC officials began ordering drug screens on
the urine samples of maternity patients suspected of using cocaine. 21
Patients testing positive for the use of cocaine were referred to a county
substance abuse treatment program.22 However, despite referrals to
treatment, MUSC staff members noted no significant decrease in cocaine
usage.23
14 Id. at 86.
is See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.A.
18 See infra Parts IV.B., V.
19 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 n.1 (2001).
2 Id. at 70; see also 2000 WL 1341474, at 5 (Resp'ts Br.) (noting the local effect of the cocaine
problem on pregnant women and citing a study indicating approximately 3221 infants per
year during that period had suffered prenatal exposure to cocaine in South Carolina).
21 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70.
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also 2000 WL 1341474, at 6 (Resp'ts Br.) (noting that virtually none of the patients
referred to counseling followed through with their treatment).
20011 287
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Approximately four months later, the general counsel of MUSC
contacted the Charleston Solicitor, Charles Condon, to offer the
hospital's assistance in prosecuting mothers whose children tested
positive for cocaine at birth. 24 Condon subsequently created a task force
consisting of MUSC officials, the City of Charleston Police Department,
the Department of Social Services, and the County Substance Abuse
Commission. 25
Deliberations of the task force resulted in MUSC's adoption of a
formal policy dealing with patient drug use during pregnancy. 26 The
policy provided that a patient would be tested if she met one or more of
nine established criteria indicating possible drug use.27 Additionally, the
policy required that a chain of custody be followed in testing the urine
samples in order to preserve their evidentiary value.28 Further, the
policy provided that patients testing positive would be referred for
substance abuse treatment.29 Most significantly, the policy included the
threat of prosecution of those failing to comply with treatment
recommendations. 30 Notably, the policy was silent as to recommended
24 Fergusont, 532 U.S. at 70-71. This action was taken after one of MUSC's employees learned
that police in Greenville, South Carolina, were charging pregnant women who used
cocaine under the state's child abuse statute. 2000 WL 728149, at 3 (Pet'rs Br.). Under
South Carolina law, a viable fetus is considered a child. See Whitner v. South Carolina, 492
S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997) (finding that a fetus is a "person" with respect to statutes
proscribing child abuse); South Carolina v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding
that, although inapplicable in the case at bar, state law permits action for homicide based
on the killing of a viable fetus).
2 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71.
6 Id.
27 Id. These criteria included the following medical symptoms indicative of drug use: "1.
No prenatal care; 2. Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation; 3. Incomplete prenatal care;
4. Abruptio placentae; 5. Intrauterine fetal death; 6. Preterm labor of 'no obvious cause'; 7.
IUGR of 'no obvious cause'; 8. Previously known drug or alcohol abuse; or 9. Unexplained
congenital anomalies." 2000 WL 1341474, at 8 (Resp'ts Br.). Despite these criteria, the case
was viewed by the Court as involving suspicionless searches, lacking probable cause or
any individualized suspicion. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76.
2 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71-72; 2000 WL 728149, at 4 (Pet'rs Br.).
" Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
10 Id. MUSC viewed this requirement as essential to provide the leverage necessary to
make the program effective. Id. The policy initially provided that patients found to be
using cocaine during pregnancy would only be arrested following a second positive test or
a missed counseling appointment, but that patients found using after labor would be
arrested immediately. Id. This policy was later amended to provide a treatment option to
all patients prior to arrest. Id. MUSC's policy also provided procedures for the police to
follow when arresting patients and articulated the specific offenses that patients could be
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changes in prenatal care of patients found to be using cocaine and the
medical treatment of infants born to mothers who used the drug.31
The plaintiffs in Ferguson were ten female MUSC patients who had
been arrested after providing urine samples that tested positive for
cocaine.32 In addition to other claims, a Section 1983 action was brought
against representatives of MUSC, the City of Charleston, and law
enforcement officials who helped to develop and enforce the hospital's
policy. 33 The action alleged that the drug tests administered pursuant to
the policy were violative of the Fourth Amendment.? At trial, the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had in fact consented to the
searches by voluntarily providing the urine samples.35 Alternatively, the
defendants contended that the searches were reasonable, even if
nonconsensual, under the special needs exception. 36
The district court held that as the searches were conducted for law
enforcement purposes, the special needs exception was inapplicable. 37
However, it submitted the consent defense to the jury, who found for the
defendants.38 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed without reaching
the issue of consent, finding instead that the searches were reasonable
under the special needs doctrine.39
charged with, depending on the stage of pregnancy at which the mother's cocaine use was
detected. Id.; 2000 WL 728149, at 16 (Pet'rs Br.). The policy also instructed police to
interrogate the patients in an attempt to determine the identity of the person providing the
illicit drugs. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
31 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
32 d.
3 2000 WL 728149, at 19 (Pet'rs Br.). Section 1983 provides a remedy to those whose
constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities have been violated "under color of" state
law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
342000 WL 728149, at 19 (Pet'rs Br.). Although part of the United States Constitution, the
Fourth Amendment has been found to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 33 (1949).
- Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
36 Id. The defendants cited two distinct special needs for screening its maternity patients
for cocaine use. 2000 WL 1341474, at 3 (Resp'ts Br.). First, a clinical need was argued to be
necessary in order for doctors to provide effective medical treatment to the mother and the
fetus. Id. Second, the defendants suggested a larger social need existed to deter maternal
drug use and its effects. Id.
37 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73-74. The opinion of the District Court was not reported.
38Id. at 74.
39 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 479 (4th Cir. 1999).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and
remanded the case for a finding on the issue of consent.40 Regarding
special needs, the Court held that the searches at issue constituted a far
greater invasion of privacy than the searches in four previous cases in
which the Court considered suspicionless drug testing programs. 41 The
Court further held that, in contrast to earlier precedents, the special need
asserted by the defendants in Ferguson was not sufficiently divorced
from the state's general interest in law enforcement.42 Therefore, the
drug tests fell outside the Court's previously established special needs
exception. 43
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF FERGUSON v. CITY OF CHARLESTON
Traditionally, the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment could be fulfilled only by
obtaining a warrant from a neutral magistrate upon a showing of
probable cause.44 Beginning in the 1960s, however, the Court began to
recognize a number of exceptions to the general rule requiring the
presence of a warrant and probable cause in nonconsensual searches. 45
Frank v. Maryland46 represents the first instance in which a governmental
search conducted without a warrant was upheld. In Frank, the Court
found the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to housing inspectors whose
civil, regulatory searches were not conducted for the purpose of
40 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76. Certiorari was granted at Ferguson v. Cihj of Charleston, 528 U.S.
1187 (2000).
41 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77-78 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
42 Id. at 84.
43 Id.
44 Buffaloe, supra note 3, at 530. Debate continues regarding whether the Fourth
Amendment was intended by the Framers to require the presence of a warrant in all
government searches. This is due to the wording of the text of the amendment which
separates two clauses: the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 761, 765-67 (1994)
(suggesting that reasonableness only is required under the amendment). But see Anthony
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 397-400 (1974)
(suggesting that the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment supports
the view that the Framers intended to require warrants in all government searches).
45 Buffaloe, supra note 3, at 530. Buffaloe suggests that the Court found this change
necessary to provide increased flexibility for non-traditional applications of the Fourth
Amendment, such as the frisks at issue in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 30 (1968). Id.
46 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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collecting evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions. 47 Eight years
later, however, the Court overruled Frank.48 In Camara v. Municipal
Court,49 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's protections
extended to searches conducted under civil, as well as criminal
justifications5s However, the Court recognized that in some instances,
forcing the government to comply with the warrant and probable cause
requirements would often make needed civil inspections impossible.5'
Because such inspections were required for the public good, but
unworkable under a probable cause standard, the Court suggested it
would be necessary to engage in balancing the governmental and
individual interests to determine the reasonableness of such a search.5 2
In 1985, the Court took a substantial step toward establishing the
balancing test as the new standard for determining the reasonableness
requirement.53 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,% the Court found a principal's
warrantless search of a student's purse to be reasonable.55 Finding the
warrant requirement to be particularly unsuited to the educational
47 Id. at 365.
48 See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
49 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
50 Id. at 534. The Cainara Court considered a writ to prohibit the prosecution of a defendant
who refused to allow San Francisco Department of Public Health officials to inspect his
home without a warrant. Id. at 525-27. In both Cainara and its companion case, the Court
held that warrantless administrative safety inspections constituted significant intrusions on
privacy that were protected by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id. at 534;
see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
51 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
52 Id. at 536-37. The Court stated "(u]nfortunately, there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails." Id. Since Canara was decided, several well-defined exceptions to
the warrant and probable cause requirements have been developed by the Court. See
Andrew P. Massman, Note, Dng Testing High School and Junior High School Shtdents After
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: Proposed Guidelines for School Districts, 31 VAL. U. L.
REV. 721, 734 (1997). For example, warrants are not required when border searches are
being conducted, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), when
the search involves an administrative search of a closely regulated industry, United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972), by police officers that stop and frisk a suspect with
reasonable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), or when officers are in hot pursuit
of a suspect, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
13 Harlin Ray Dean, Jr., Note, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb: The Fourth
Amendment Hangs in the Balance, 68 N.C. L. REV. 389, 397 (1990).
- 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
55 Id. at 343. The search in T.L.O., conducted after the student was found smoking, revealed
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 328.
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environment, the Court, citing the Camara balancing precedent, held that
the legality of the search depended merely on its reasonableness under
the totality of the circumstances. 56  It was in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence that the special needs doctrine had its genesis.57 Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the Court's implication that balancing should
be the rule rather than the exception.58 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
asserted that the Court had erred by proceeding directly to the balancing
analysis without first considering the need for the warrantless search.59
Justice Blackmun felt that only in "exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." 60
Two years later, the Court adopted Justice Blackmun's special needs
terminology in O'Connor v. Ortega.61 In O'Connor, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a state employee's desk by
his employer, prompted by the employee's misconduct. Using a special
needs analysis, the Court reasoned that the employer's interest in
searching was other than "the normal need for law enforcement." 62 The
Court further reasoned that a warrant requirement would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. 63 Applying the balancing test,
the Court found the governmental interests outweighed the intrusion
into the employee's privacy and, therefore, found the search to be
constitutional.64 Notably, Justice Blackmun dissented from the Court's
opinion.65 He felt the Court had merely recited a special need rather
than actually identified one and had erred in weighing the public and
- Id. at 340, 342.
57 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.7 (2001).
s T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
N Id. at 351 (explaining that the Court had previously only applied a balancing analysis
when "confronted with 'a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility"').
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
62 Id. at 724.
3Id.
Id. at 725.
6 Id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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private interests. 66 Indeed, these criticisms would continue to plague the
Court's future special needs decisions.67
The next special needs case decided by the Court significantly
blurred the distinction between searches conducted for traditional law
enforcement purposes and those conducted for other governmental
purposes. 68 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,69 the Court upheld the warrantless
search of a probationer's home by probation officials.70 The search
resulted in the probationer's prosecution and conviction for a weapons
offense.71 Rather than relying on several other available substantive
arguments to affirm the probationer's conviction, the Court instead
invoked its newly-created special needs doctrine.72 The Court held that
the state's operation of a probation system presented needs beyond those
of normal law enforcement. 73 These needs, the Court continued, were
sufficient to invoke a special needs balancing analysis to determine the
6 Id. at 741-47.
67 See generally Ames, supra note 11, at 288 (asserting that "special needs" became merely a
phrase the Court would invoke to explain that the search was not related to the "normal
needs" of law enforcement); Dean, supra note 53, at 404 (arguing that a central defect of the
special needs balancing test is its susceptibility to the Justices' subjective beliefs). Dean
suggests that the presence of the Justices' subjective opinions have become apparent in the
special needs opinions. Dean, supra note 53, at 404. Dean notes that Chief Justice
Rehnquist consistently gives more weight to government interests while Justices Marshall
and Brennan gave more weight to privacy concerns. Id. Judicial balancing even outside the
special needs arena is controversial. Inherently defective in a balancing approach is that
"[e]ach judge, due to individual observations, training, and experience, inevitably will
view each situation and its unique facts from a different perspective" and "no safeguards
prevent a judge from manipulating the factors to reach a result he desires." Id. at 403. But
see Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16, 22-
25 (1988) (defending balancing by suggesting that its subjective bias element can be
minimized by judicial care in opinion writing).
6 See Buffaloe, supra note 3, at 539.
- 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
70 Id. at 880. The search was conducted pursuant to the probation department's policy and
Griffin's conditions of probation after information was provided to probation authorities
by police that Griffin was in possession of weapons. Id. at 870-71.
"Id. at 872.
7 Id. at 873-74. The Court's reliance on special needs in Griffin has been criticized because
more substantial bases for finding the search constitutional existed. See Buffaloe, supra note
3, at 551. Buffaloe points out that warrant and probable cause requirements are
inapplicable to those in custody and that the Court could have extended this logic to those
on probation on a "constructive custody" theory. Id. She also suggests that the Court
could have found that probationers waive their Fourth Amendment rights by accepting a
term of probation rather than a sentence of imprisonment. Id.
73 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74.
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search's reasonableness. 74 Again, Justice Blackmun dissented.75 Justice
Blackmun stated that a balancing analysis was only to be invoked under
special needs if obtaining a warrant would be impracticable.76 Despite
Justice Blackmun's attempts to restrain the spread of the special needs
exception, the Court soon extended the doctrine to a series of cases
involving suspicionless drug testing.77
Skinner v. Railwaj Labor Executives' Ass'n8 presented the first
opportunity to consider the special needs exception within the context of
governmental drug testing programs. In Skinner, the Court upheld
regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration.79 These regulations
required blood and urine tests of railroad employees following major
train accidents. 80 The Court first determined that the collection and
testing of urine was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.81 The Court then found that the government's interest in
ensuring railroad safety by regulating railroad employees was, indeed,
beyond the normal needs of law enforcement. 82 After applying the
balancing test, the Court determined that the government's interests
were sufficiently compelling to obviate the normal requirement of
individualized suspicion.83 Concerning individual interests, the Court
74 1d. at 874.
75 Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76 Id. Quoting his own dissenting opinion in O'Connor, Justice Blackmun reminded the
majority that "'[olnly when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a
government official cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause without sacrificing
the ultimate goals to which a search would contribute, does the Court turn to a 'balancing"
test to formulate a standard of reasonableness...." Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709,741 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
7 Smiley, supra note 5, at 817.
- 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
7Id. at 634.
wId. at 609.
81 Id. at 617. "Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts
of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." Id. (citing, inter alia, Lovvorn v.
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d
1139 (3d Cir. 1988); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987)).
82 Id. at 620. The Court considered whether the results of the drug tests could be turned
over to law enforcement authorities and determined that, although nothing in the
regulations prevented such action, the record failed to show that results were intended to
be provided to police or ever had been. Id. at 621 n.5.
83 Id. at 624. "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search
are minimal, and where an important governmental interest . . . would be placed in
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2001], Art. 6
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regarded the intrusion on the employees' privacy as minimal.
84
Obviously concerned about the ever-widening scope of the special needs
exception, Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion.85
Justice Marshall accused the majority of taking "its longest step yet
toward reading the probable cause requirement out of the Fourth
Amendment."8 Justice Marshall felt that the decision in Skinner was
merely a reaction to the nationally perceived drug problem.87 He
invoked Justice Holmes' view regarding the dangers of allowing settled
principles of law to become malleable in the face of pressing national
problems, and warned that "principles of law, once bent, do not snap
back easily."8
In National Treasuny Employees Union v. Von Raab,89 a companion case
to Skinner, the Court reached the same conclusion. In Von Raab, the
Court considered a drug testing program of the United States Customs
Service.90  The Court found that because the Customs employees
routinely dealt with drugs and the criminal element, the government had
a "compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel
[were] physically fit, and [had] unimpeachable integrity and
judgment." 91 As such, a special need was clearly present.92 With respect
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite
the absence of such suspicion." Id. The Court's departure from the individualized
suspicion requirement in Skinner has been the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Darren K.
Sharp, Note, Dnig Testing and the Fourth Amendment: What Happened to Individualized
Suspicion?, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 149 (1997).
4 Skinzer, 489 U.S. at 627 (finding intrusion to be minimal due to the diminished
expectations of privacy held by employees in a heavily regulated industry).
5 Id. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
6Id. at 636.
87 Id. at 654. Justice Marshall compared the majority's decision in Skinner to those of
"shortsighted courts" in the past which had allowed the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War 1I and had perpetuated the McCarthy-era Red Scare. Id. at 635. He
warned that "[p]recisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is manifest,
the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great. History teaches that grave
threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure." Id.
88 Id. at 654-55, (quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Holmes' quotation, from his first dissenting opinion as a member of
the Court, is reprinted at the outset of this Comment. See supra text accompanying note 1.
89489 U.S. 656 (1989).
9 Id. at 660-61. Under the program, drug testing was to be performed on Customs
employees who applied for positions involving drug interdiction, those who carried
firearms, or those handling classified material. Id.
91 Id. at 670.
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to the privacy interests of Customs employees, the Court found that the
employees had diminished expectations of privacy and, therefore, held
the program was reasonable. 93
While the Skinner and Von Rabb decisions were soundly criticized, 94
perhaps more controversial was the Court's decision in Vernonia School
District 471 v. Acton.95 In Vernonia, an Oregon school district had adopted
a random drug testing policy for its student athletes.% This policy was
adopted in response to general concerns about an increase in drug usage
in the school system, especially among athletes, and information that the
use of drugs increased the risk of sports-related injuries. 97 In considering
the constitutionality of this program, the Court bypassed a special needs
analysis. Instead, the Court merely stated that special needs had
previously been approved in the public school context.98 Focusing on
the balancing test, the Court found that student athletes subjected to the
program had diminished expectations of privacy. 99 Meanwhile, the
9 Id. at 666 (noting that the need was beyond that of normal law enforcement because the
program did not permit the use of drug test results in a criminal prosecution without the
consent of the employee).
93 Id. at 671, 679. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from the majority's
opinion. Id. at 680 (Scalia & Stevens, J.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that unlike all of
the Court's prior special needs cases, no special need existed because no documented
instances of corruption, caused by drug use of customs employees, had been recorded. Id.
at 680-84.
9 See, e.g., Dean, snpra note 53, at 409 (suggesting that Von Rabb eliminated the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment for the sake of government
convenience). But see Daniel J. Fritze, Comment, Dnig Testing of Government Employees and
Government-Regulated Industries: Expounding the Fourth Amendment, 25 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 831, 859 (1990) (finding Skinner and Von Rabb to be "logical extensions of pre-existing
law that reasonably expound the fourth amendment").
- 515 U.S. 646 (1995). See David J. Gottlieb, Drug Testing, Collective Suspicion, and a Fourth
Amendment out of Balance:- A Reply to Professor Howard, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 35
(Winter 1997) (discussing Vernon ia's controversial nature). Gottlieb states:
[In Vernonia] [t]he Court thus declared as constitutional a policy
requiring the mandatory testing of thousands of pre-high school
children, under conditions more degrading than those permitted in
Skinner and Von Rabb, in a situation where general public safety was
not endangered, based on an 'epidemic' that the school board had
never demonstrated ....
Id.
% Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648-49.
7 Id.
98Id. at 653 (referring to T.L.O.).
9 Id. at 657. The Court stated that, due to "communal undress" in locker rooms, school
athletics were "not for the bashful." Id.
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Court found the government's interest to be at least as important as that
at stake in Von Rabb and Skinner.1o° Because of its apparent lack of
principled objective analysis, Vernonia caused many to question the
Court's special needs jurisprudence.10 1 The balancing test, which
appeared to many far too malleable and subjective, received the brunt of
the attack.1 02
Most recently, the Court decided Chandler v. Miller,103 a case
involving the drug testing of candidates for certain Georgia public
offices. Chandler represents the first occasion the Court struck down a
suspicionless drug testing policy under a special needs approach. 1°4 The
majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, never reached the
100 Id. at 661. Justice Scalia, who wrote the Court's opinion, has been accused of
extravagantly exaggerating the risks faced by the Vemonia students and the justifications
for the school district's policy by comparing student drug use to the situations in Skinner
and Von Raab, where drug use could potentially endanger hundreds of lives. See Gottlieb,
supra note 95, at 34. Citing a lack of individualized suspicion or a showing that a warrant
requirement would be impractical, as well as a lack of specific evidence of drug use in the
grade school to which the program was extended, Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting
opinion which was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 667-86
(O'Connor, Stevens, & Souter, J.J., dissenting).
101 See generally Gottlieb, supra note 95, at 27-28 (referring to Vernonia as "yet another
example of the poverty of analysis that accompanies the Court's current 'balancing'
test...."); Joaquin G. Padilla, Comment, Vemonia School District 47) v. Acton: Flushing
the Fourth Amendment -Student Athletes' Privacy Interests Go Down the Drain, 73 DENY. U. L.
REV. 571 (1996); Sherri L. Toussaint, Note, Something is Terribly Wrong Here: Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 75 NEB. L. REV. 151 (1996); Rhett Traband, The
Acton Case: The Supreme Court's Gradual Sacrifice of Privacy Rights on the Altar of the War on
Drugs, 100 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1995).
102 See George M. Dery Ill, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Thian Schoolchildren ? How
Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 73,88-89 (1998). Dery observes:
The special needs balancing analysis is not truly an analysis at all. It
merely demonstrates whether or not as few as five members of the
Court value a particular government action. . . . Facts can be
emphasized or ignored in order to achieve a preordained result. If the
Court determines that a particular government behavior should be
permitted, it simply highlights the state's interests and minimizes
those of the individual.
Id.; see also Gottlieb, supra note 95, at 28 (observing that the Court's balancing test invariably
resulted in a devaluing of private interests while governmental interests are overvalued by
discussing the general social problem being addressed by the search policy, rather than the
particular needs of the testing scheme at issue).
1M 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
10 Smiley, supra note 5, at 824.
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balancing analysis105 Instead, the Court articulated a new standard for
what constitutes a special need106 The Court found that, unless the
government interest meets a minimum threshold of importance, the
search would be deemed unreasonable without reaching the balancing
test.1 7 Applying this new standard, the Court found the government's
interest in drug testing candidates for public office to be merely a
symbolic gesture against drug use rather than a special need deserving
of a waiver of the warrant requirement.108
The Chandler Court indicated a desire to limit its special needs
exception and return to a truer interpretation of Justice Blackmun's
doctrine.10 9 However, by invoking its earlier precedents to achieve the
result in Chandler rather than overruling or modifying them, the Court
suggested that Chandler was distinguishable on its facts when, in reality,
the testing program was indistinguishable from the one at issue in Von
Rabb and likely would have been upheld had the Court remained true to
its earlier interpretation of the special needs doctrine."0 While Chandler
clearly represented a retreat from the special needs doctrine, its end
result was to muddle the exception, leaving courts confused as to its
application."'
10 Ames, supra note 11, at 288.
10 Id.
1l7 Id.
108 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22. "What is left, after a close review of Georgia's scheme, is the
image the State seeks to project. By requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug
testing, Georgia displays its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse .... The need
revealed, in short, is symbolic, not 'special'...." Id. See Eric B. Post, Comment, Chandler
v. Miller: Drug Testing Candidates for State Office Under the "Special Needs" Exception, 64
BROOK. L. REv. 1153, 1173-74 (1998) (stating that Chandler was wrongly decided and that
ensuring that high public office holders are drug-free constitutes a special need).
109 See Dery, supra note 102, at 74; see also Justin Scott, Case Note, Chandler v. Miller: The
Supreme Court Closed the Door on the Factual Instances that Warrant Suspicionless Searches, 49
MERCER L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1998) ("In Chandler the Court once again breathed life into the
Fourth Amendment, taking a small step toward reading the probable cause requirement
back into the Constitution.").
110 Ames, supra note 11, at 294; see also Ross H. Parr, Note, Suspicionless Drg Testing and
Chandler v. Miller: Is the Supreme Court Making the Right Decisions?, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 241 (1998) (arguing that the Court was unsuccessful in distinguishing Chandler from
the special needs precedents). Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that it was only
through distorting the prior special needs cases that the majority was able to find special
needs inapplicable to the Georgia statute. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 327 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
"I Smiley, supra note 5, at 825-26.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON
A. The Ferguson Opinion
It was within this developing special needs framework that the
Court analyzed Ferguson. Written by Justice Stevens, the majority
opinion attempts to distinguish Ferguson from the Court's earlier
precedents that considered the constitutionality of suspicionless drug
testing." 2 The Court noted that the intrusion on privacy at issue was
much greater than had been considered in Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, or
Chandler."3  The Court found that those cases were readily
distinguishable as they had involved no misunderstanding as to the
purpose of the intrusion.114  Additionally, the Court held that the
plaintiffs in Ferguson, hospital patients, enjoyed a greater expectation of
privacy than did those subjected to urine tests in Skinner, Von Rabb,
Vernonia, or Chandler.115 However, the Court stated that the crucial
difference between Ferguson and its earlier precedents involved the
nature of the special need at stake.116 Unlike the asserted special needs in
Skinner, Von Rabb, Vernonia, or Chandler, which the Court found to be
divorced from the state's general interest in law enforcement, the Court
found that MUSC's policy used law enforcement and the threat of
prosecution from its inception in order to compel compliance with the
program's mandates. 1 7
Responding to the dissent's assertions that the policy's purpose was
to protect the health of the patients and their unborn children, the Court
112 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,77-81 (2001).
113 Id. at 78. It is worth noting that in order to present the prior special needs cases as a
consistent body of law, the majority in Ferguson found it necessary to cite the dissenting
opinion in Chandler. Id. at 80 n.17 (citing Chandler, 520 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
MI d. at 78 (noting also that protections had existed in those earlier cases which prevented
the dissemination of the testing results to third persons). But see infra note 130 (discussing
the relevance of whether or not test results could be reported to police to the Court's
decisions in the prior cases).
11 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. The Court's mention of privacy interests here adds additional
confusion to the majority opinion as privacy interests had previously only been analyzed in
the special needs cases once the Court endeavored to apply the balancing test. See
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,657 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Rabb, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
627 (1989).
116 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
117 Id. at 80.
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found it necessary to distinguish between the policy's "ultimate goal"
and its "immediate objective."" 8 The majority found it critical that,
while the ultimate goal of the policy may have been to reduce cocaine
use among expectant women, its immediate objective was to obtain
evidence to be used against them.119 This, the majority reasoned, was
evidenced by policy language that dealt more with law enforcement
procedures than with medical treatment, and by the extensive police and
prosecutorial involvement in the policy's development. 2 0 Noting that
the policy's primary purpose was to generate inculpatory evidence, the
Court held that the program did not fall within the special needs
exception.' 2 ' Therefore, the majority did not reach a balancing analysis
of MUSC's program.
The majority opinion, while reasonable on its surface, leaves
questions for those acquainted with prior special needs cases. Can it
really be the case that women undergoing intensely invasive obstetrical
examinations have a greater expectation of privacy than student athletes,
railroad employees, or customs officials? Is it such a stretch to imagine,
for a cocaine-using maternity patient, that drug use would be discovered
during the course of numerous medical tests? Further, is it unreasonable
to assume that, if discovered, such drug use would be reported to police?
Did the Court, despite its attempts to avoid a balancing of private and
governmental interests, in fact apply the balancing test by considering
the privacy expectations of the plaintiff maternity patients?122
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy was unable to view the
"ultimate goal" versus "immediate objective" distinction as critical. 123
Justice Kennedy noted that this distinction had no foundation in any of
the prior special needs cases, all of which turned on what was now being
118 Id. at 82.
119 Id. at 82-83. "Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social
purpose or objective . . . virtually any nonconsensual, suspicionless search could be
immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose." Id. at 84. But see supra note 102 (suggesting that
the Court routinely had identified the government's need for the search in broad societal
terms in prior cases).
120 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82.
121 Id. at 84.
122 See supra note 115 (noting the Court's inconsistency in evaluating the plaintiffs' privacy
expectations).
1 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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termed the "ultimate goal." 124 Rather, Justice Kennedy believed the
distinction between Ferguson and the Court's earlier precedents was that
none of the latter cases had tolerated the routine and active inclusion of
law enforcement officials. 125 Further, Justice Kennedy stated that in the
previous cases the test-subject at least had been put on notice that drug-
screening was to take place. 26 With his opinion, Justice Kennedy seems
willing to go where the majority will not. Not wanting to create
additional confusion to the special needs doctrine by recognizing the
majority's "ultimate goal" distinction, his opinion instead suggests what
seems to actually be motivating the Court: that the level of police and
prosecutorial involvement in MUSC's. policy simply goes beyond what
the Fourth Amendment can bear in terms of reasonableness. However,
striking down the policy was not an easy thing to accomplish in light of
the special needs precedents, an observation not lost on the dissenting
members of the Court.
Justice Scalia penned a dissenting opinion which was joined in part
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 27 Noting that MUSC's
drug testing policy had originally developed in response to concerns
over increased drug use, and only later included law enforcement,
Justice Scalia asserted that the testing program fell within the special
needs exception.128  Justice Scalia also uncovered an important
inconsistency in the Court's precedent. He noted that Griffin had
previously invoked special needs to approve the search of a
probationer's home, conducted in response to information provided by
law enforcement officers, and at which police were present.1 29 Likening
the MUSC officials to the probation officials in Griffin, Justice Scalia
124 Id. at 87.
12 Id. at 88.
12 Id. at 90-91. Justice Kennedy felt that such implied consent to drug testing by those
tested went to the reasonableness of the testing programs. Id. at 91.
127 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Only Part II of Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Justice
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 98-104 (Scalia & Thomas, J.J., & Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Part I, representing Justice Scalia alone, asserted that the plaintiffs had in
fact consented to the drug tests. Id. at 91-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 99-100 (Scalia & Thomas, J.J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's
approach to special needs perhaps demonstrates the doctrine's subjectivity. Justice Scalia
appears rather schizophrenic in the special needs cases, alternately approving and
disapproving of the testing programs at issue in Skinner, Von Rabb, Vernn ia, and Chandler.
See generally Smiley, supra note 5, at 835 n.196.
'2 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 100-01. See supra note 70 (discussing police involvement in the
search in Griffin).
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asserted that the special needs doctrine did not prohibit the involvement
of law enforcement officials in a warrantless search.130 Therefore, Justice
Scalia concluded that the majority had erred in finding the two cases
distinguishable.' 31
B. Ferguson's Meaning for Special Needs
Justice Scalia's argument concerning Griffin is not without merit and
is suggestive of the larger problem facing the Ferguson Court: while the
testing program undertaken by MUSC was found by the majority to be
distasteful, inconsistencies in the prior special needs cases did not
provide a clear basis for finding the program unconstitutional.
Certainly, had a pre-Chandler analysis been applied and a balancing test
been undertaken, the Court would have had no choice but to approve
MUSC's policy. 132 The governmental interest in preventing harm to both
pregnant women and unborn children could hardly be denied to be at
least as compelling as the need to test the customs officials in Von Rabb.
Likewise, the privacy expectations of women undergoing obstetrical
examinations would necessarily be at least as diminished as those of the
students in Vernonia.1" Even following Chandler, it seems likely that
MUSC's policy would have been upheld had the Court remained true to
the preexisting special needs framework. Surely, the hospital's need to
protect its patients and their unborn children from the harmful effects of
cocaine would meet Chandler's "threshold of significance" requirement.
It likely was due to these prior inconsistencies that the majority, in order
to preempt any balancing analysis and strike down MUSC's testing
program, found it necessary to create the "ultimate goal" versus
130 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 100-01. The majority attempted to address this charge in a footnote
by maintaining that none of the previous special needs cases had tolerated a significant
level of law enforcement involvement, that the Griffin Court had not addressed whether
routine police involvement would preclude a special needs analysis, and that the
probationer at issue in Griffin had a lesser expectation of privacy than did the patients in
Ferguson. Id. at 81 n.15 (majority opinion). Prior to Ferguson, the Court had not been clear
as to whether a search conducted under special needs could properly lead to criminal
prosecution. Carmen Vaughn, Note, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via tlhe Special
Needs Doctrine to Prosecute Pregnant Drg Users: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 857, 868 (2000) (observing that whether or not urine test results were disclosed to law
enforcement officers or prosecutors had been considered by the Court in both Von Rabb and
Vernonia, but had not been dispositive in either case).
M Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 101-02 (Scalia & Thomas, J.J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
132 This was alluded to by Justice Scalia in the dissenting opinion. See id.
133 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the Vernonia Court's rationale for
finding diminished privacy concerns among student athletes).
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"immediate purpose" distinction. However, in doing so, the Court
created additional uncertainty in an area already highly criticized for its
incongruity.134  Far from being the panacea for the special needs
exception some hoped it would be, Ferguson removed none of the post-
Chandler confusion surrounding the exception.135
The Court in Ferguson reached the correct result. Clearly the Fourth
Amendment cannot sanction the type of officious behavior displayed by
MUSC. Had the testing in Ferguson been upheld by the Court, it surely
would not have been long until other governmental officials, at the
behest of law enforcement, began similar testing programs designed to
skirt traditional warrant and probable cause requirements. 136 However,
the Court failed to seize the opportunity presented by Ferguson to
address the inconsistencies plaguing the special needs doctrine. At a
minimum, the Court should have acknowledged that Griffin was
wrongly decided under special needs. Having done so, the Court could
have established a clear rule that law enforcement involvement of any
kind in a warrantless search would not be permitted under the special
134 See, e.g., Smiley, supra note 5, at 826 (noting that the special needs cases, because of their
inconsistencies, are nearly impossible to reconcile with one another). But see Michael E.
Brewer, Comment, Chandler v. Miller: No Turning Back from a Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 275, 304 (1997) (arguing that the Court's special
needs approach is "a legitimate response to exigencies and situations not envisioned or
contemplated by the Framers" and that the balancing test's "reasonableness standard lacks
the definition and precision of the probable cause standard in part because it has not had
the time and opportunity to ripen and mature").
13 See Bryony J. Gagan, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, South Carolina: 'Fetal Abuse,' Dng
Testing, and the Fourth Amendment, 53 STAN. L. REV. 491, 511-12 (2000) (speculating that
Ferguson would provide clarity to the special needs doctrine). "It is tempting to hope that
the Court has finally recognized that the 'special needs' exception threatens to swallow the
warrant preference rule, and will take the opportunity [presented by Ferguson] to narrow
the scope of the exception." Id. Gagan also refers to City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32 (2000), as a 'special needs' case which the Court could use in conjunction with Ferguson
as an opportunity to clarify the special needs doctrine. Id. at 494, 512. Edmond involved the
use of random drug interdiction checkpoints on roadways by the Indianapolis Police
Department. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-35. While Edinond was decided by the Court
approximately four months prior to Ferguson, the City of Indianapolis did not attempt to
justify the checkpoint program under the special needs doctrine. See id. at 42-47.
Furthermore, the Court primarily analyzed Edmnond in light of its "checkpoint cases" and
not squarely within the context of special needs. Id. at 41.
136 Cf. United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1992) (addressing police using
burglary suspect's neighbor and a cordless telephone to circumvent wiretapping laws).
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needs exception. 137 Instead, by attempting to distinguish Ferguson on its
facts, the Court not only perpetuated the myth that all is well with the
special needs exception, but also provided little guidance to lower courts
faced with the challenge of attempting to apply it.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Court abandoned the traditional warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, confusion has naturally resulted. This
confusion has found expression in the Court's special needs doctrine: a
doctrine that early in its history allowed nearly any search to be upheld
under its malleable balancing test by emphasizing the importance of the
governmental interests at stake. With Chandler, the Court appeared to
signal an awareness that the exception had been extended beyond
circumstances envisioned at its inception and a desire to retreat from its
widespread application. However, the Chandler Court's failure to
overrule or modify any of the prior special needs cases increased the
confusion surrounding the exception.
With Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court was provided an
opportunity to revisit the special needs doctrine. The Court had
occasion to clarify, if nothing else, the extent to which law enforcement
participation in a warrantless search would bar a special needs analysis,
arguably the most important question presented by Ferguson. However,
the Court failed to squarely address this question and provide a
definitive answer. Following Ferguson, the answer to how much law
enforcement participation in a search will be tolerated under special
needs seems to be at least as much as that in Griffin, but not as much as
that undertaken by MUSC. This is hardly the degree of clarity lower
courts require in order to apply the special needs doctrine. Indeed,
Ferguson will likely prove to be of little help in providing guidance for
future special needs cases. This is due both to the unique factual
situation the Court was responding to and the Court's failure to address
prior inconsistencies within the exception. Reading Ferguson in light of
Chandler, it seems clear that the Court is attempting to restrict the
137 The Fourth Circuit also cited Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), as
supporting the proposition that law enforcement involvement in a search does not
preclude a special needs analysis. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477 n.7. However, Sitz was never
specifically identified by the Supreme Court as a special needs case. Gagan, supra note 135,
at 507.
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application of the special needs doctrine to the limits originally
envisioned by Justice Blackmun. However, until early special needs
cases are modified by the Court, confusion is likely to continue to
surround the doctrine. Indeed "principles of law, once bent, do not snap
back easily." 138
Steven R. Probst
'3 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 654-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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